Chernobyl disaster: Radiation situation in the early days of the accident
Chernobyl disaster: Radiation situation in the early days of the accident

According to various estimates, in the first days after the Chernobyl accident, the level of radiation in the air in Kiev and its environs ranged from 500 to 1050 microroentgen per hour. It was of the order of 100-150 mR / h in the premises.

At the same time, it was announced at a press conference for foreign journalists in Moscow on May 8, 1986, that, the radiation level within the boundaries of the 30-km zone from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant reached in the first days of May no more than 10-15 mR / h, and with each subsequent during the day, the background radiation decreases markedly.

Well, what can we say – it`s a completely optimistic forecast that gives an unambiguous diagnosis of the situation in general and the country’s leadership in particular – irresponsibility and deceit.

This was especially inhumane against the background of the fact that literally a day after the press conference, the first victims began to appear in a Moscow clinic among firefighters exposed to terrible radiation exposure at the time of the liquidation of the Chernobyl NPP fire on the night of April 26, 1986.

The declassified archives of the OCHA indicate that the Committee began to receive information from agents about frequent cases of mistrust of official information of the country’s leadership regarding the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl accident. The version presented by the party leadership about what happened at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was so comforting that the average citizen might not give it much importance.

This was the stake. But the deaths of firefighters in a Moscow clinic and the critical health consequences that began to manifest among those who were at the time of the explosion in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant, as well as those who watched him from balconies and bridges in Pripyat, carried the government’s version to the smithereens.

Some spoke about this in a whisper in their own kitchen, but there were those who publicly criticized the government, pointing to its deceit and hypocrisy. At first, they generally ignored the disaster, then, in order to prevent an impending international scandal, they spoke in a contradictory and unspecific manner.

In addition, some had the opportunity to listen to foreign sources of broadcasting – the key to understanding the situation. Often, precisely because of harsh criticism of foreign media, the influence of foreign diplomatic missions, the leadership of the USSR was forced to publicly disclose data on the scale of the disaster, the consequences for the health of citizens.

A certificate dated July 3, 1986, received from an agent of the KGB, shows that, against the background of those who are afraid of what happened at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, there are citizens who are very sarcastic, and as proof of this the following phrase from a Kiev resident is given: “… the level of radiation in the city is normal, although nobody specifically has ever called this norm. Over time, everyone will get used to it and no atomic bombs will be scary for us then. ”

Ambiguous situation among doctors after the Chernobyl accident

Doctors were given a clear intention to make false diagnoses. This is confirmed by medical certificates issued to many victims of the Chernobyl accident, in which frank signs of radiation sickness were qualified as vegetovascular dystonia.

The difficulty was that not many were able to correctly determine the degree of exposure, since the bulk of the instruments made by such measurements were either not suitable for use or, for technical reasons, incapable of accurately measuring the level of radiation. Many doctors, justifying their actions, referred to a certain Order No. 24 p. of 05/11/86. But there were also disagreements with such “indifference of the medical staff.”

There were still doubters about the diagnosis in the first days after the disaster, but 3-4 days later, after assessing the health status of the majority of the victims, the diagnosis could be made with a 100% guarantee – radiation sickness due to a high dose of radiation. Some progressive-minded doctors expressed criticism of colleagues and advocated the inadmissibility of a negligent attitude to diagnosis.

They considered the main aggravating factor not only the lack of morality in such a practice, the main one – the consequences that are fraught with human health if the diagnosis is incorrect, the treatment is inappropriate. As a result, this led to objective confusion regarding the establishment of subsequent patient disability.

SSC (State Security Committee) recommendations: how to behave with foreigners – methodological recommendations

A training manual was received by the SSC’s office in Kiev, saying: “…how should Soviet citizens behave in private conversations with foreigners about the events at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, in particular, what arguments should be used to prevent provocations from foreign citizens.”

This training manual is a real example of how they knew how to conduct empty talk about anything in the Soviet state. It recommended that the interlocutor be taken away from reality – to beat around the bush and not touch the essence of the matter.

There should have been “empty talk”, and the Chernobyl accident should not be given much importance, referring to the fact that its consequences are no worse than the accidents taken in total for countries such as England or the United States. It was recommended to focus on the fact that: “The causal link of the Chernobyl accident is exclusively a human factor, and not the technological backwardness and error of the equipment used by Soviet nuclear scientists”ю

At the same time, the propaganda hype of the Western press around the Chernobyl accident characterizes its anti-Soviet orientation. ”The huge work done after the Chernobyl accident, including the technical and preventive work at all other Soviet nuclear power plants, should also be emphasized in order to ensure safety.

In order to prevent the possible leakage of “disadvantageous information” to the West, the SSC agents in Kiev and the Kiev region were given the task of stopping the spread of information and contamination of Chernobyl, Pripyat and their environs by the decay products of radionuclides, in particular cesium-137, among Chernobyl and other organizations.

It was also necessary to quickly respond and instantly report on all kinds of actions by foreign activists and organizations for the early preparation of counter-propaganda activities on this issue.

Such measures have yielded results. A month after the Chernobyl disaster, publications in some Western publications about the Chernobyl disaster began to have a more “pro-Soviet” character.